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Schuhalter: Successor Liability for Defective Products: A Tort Exception to a

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE
PRODUCTS: A TORT EXCEPTION TO A
CORPORATE RULE
"The general rule, which is well settled, is that where one company sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to another company,
the latter is not liable for the debts and [product] liabilities of th@
transferor." 1 In limited circumstances, exceptions to the general rule
warrant recovery against a successor. These exceptions are often
construed narrowly, however, 'causing the general rule to govern.3
The result is frequently a remediless complainant. To redress this
situation, some courts have broadly interpreted the applicability of
the exceptions" or have created new exceptions that essentially consume the rule.5
Where an exception is broadly construed or a new exception is
applied, a successor company may incur expenses greater than those
bargained for as a result of unanticipated liability for tort judgments. As the transferor has generally contracted to retain such tort
liability, it has, in effect, received a windfall profit. Where retrospectively broad interpretation of successor liability law, on the other
hand, seeks to foster a tort claimant's recovery, the efficiency of business planning is minimized. The tenuousness of successor liability
law has resulted from sporadically flexible interpretation of the exceptions" and fortuitous implementation of new exceptions. 7 Prospec1. 15 W.

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 7122

(1973 ed.).
2. E.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (applying New Jersey law).
3. E.g., Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Kloberdanz v.
Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying California law).
4. Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974) (applying Pennsylvania law), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., Inc., 501 F.2d 1145
(1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law).
5. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
6. E.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
7. Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981); Ray v. Alad
Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty
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tive modification of the general rule of nonliability to the successor is
thus necessary to achieve equity for the parties involved.
This note proposes such a modification of the rule. The first section reviews the development of products liability law and the strict
liability trend. The following section discusses successor liability and
illustrates the centrally important interplay of tort and corporate
principles in that area. The analysis treats traditionl exceptions, repent case developments that broadly construe them, and the development of new exceptions-primarily the product-line concept, which
applies strict liability to determine successor liability. The last section proposes a legislative approach, balancing corporate and tort
principles in a manner designed to promote uniformity and certainty
in the successor liability area.'
PRODUCT LIABILITY DEVELOPMENT 9

Historically, responsibility for defective products was based in
contract: Where there was no privity of contract between plaintiff
and defendant, there could be no recovery. 10 To avoid this frequently
harsh result, the courts began to develop exceptions to the privity
rule."'
Prior to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 2 exceptions to the
privity requirement were made only when a product was either imminently or inherently dangerous.1 3 Judge Cardozo, however, extended the exceptions to include any product "reasonably certain to
place life and limb in peril when negligently made."1 4 More than
Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
8. While the need for uniformity in the products liability area has prompted the United
States Department of Commerce to draft a Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed.
Reg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UPLA], the Act does not deal with successor liability. Perhaps this reflects a view that successor liability should not be governed by tort law. Tort
law considerations are, however, essential to the proposal suggested in this note, see infra notes
192-95 and accompanying text. Tort law considerations have also been utilized by courts, see
infra text accompanying notes 124-26, 137-51. For a critical analysis of the UPLA, see Twerski & Weinstein, A Critiqueof the Uniform Product Liability Law-A Rush to Judgment, 28
DRAKE L. REV. 221 (1979).

9. Detailed historical analysis of products liability law is beyond the scope of this note.
For the classic treatment, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
10. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
11. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 9, at 1100.
12.

217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

13. Id. at 386-89, 111 N.E. at 1052-53.
14. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053. The defective product in MacPhersonwas an automo-
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forty years later, in the landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc."5 the New Jersey Supreme Court circumvented the con-

fines of privity by manipulating the concept of warranty."' The court
held that an implied warranty extends to any foreseeable user of a
product despite lack of privity between the user and the product
seller.17

The formal limitations of contract law were completely disregarded for the first time in the much noted California case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' which applied strict tort liability in a product liability action. The plaintiff in Greenman was
injured when a piece of wood flew out from beneath a defectively
designed power tool. 19 His injury occurred despite plaintiff's proper
use of the product.

0

Although the court noted the express warranty

brochure,21

warranty was not the basis of liability. Instead, the
in the
court developed a rule of strict products liability, holding that "[a]
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." 2
Numerous courts2" and the American Law Institute 24 followed
bile wheel that caused the car to collapse.
15. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
16. There is an implied warranty that a product is "reasonably fit for the general purpose for which it is manufactured and sold." Id. at 370, 161 A.2d at 76 (citations omitted). If
a product does not satisfy this representation, an action for breach of warranty exists. U.C.C.
§ 2-314 (1978).
17. 32 N.J. 413, 161 A.2d at 100. The injured plaintiff in Henningsen, the wife of the
purchaser of the defective automobile, was considered a foreseeable user.
18. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
19. Id. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
20. Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
21. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
22. Id., 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
23. A conservative estimate indicates that two-thirds of the courts have followed Greenman and adopted strict products liability. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 98, at 658 (4th ed. 1971); see also J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORT PROCESS 672
(1981) (§ 402A of Restatement (second) now widely adopted; privity of contract no longer
required).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to the User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
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Greenman's lead and adopted strict tort products liability.
In Greenman, strict tort liability was imposed "to insure that
the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by
the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than
by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. 25
Since Greenman, numerous other justifications have been advanced
for the imposition of strict liability. 26 These are generally divisible
into four categories:
2 7 -Be(1) unavoidable consumer reliance on manufacturers.
cause consumers are often incapable of identifying or protecting
themselves against risks, they must rely on a manufacturer's expertise for protection.2 8 Accordingly, a manufacturer induces consumer
reliance when holding out a product as an item of quality.29
(2) manufacturer's economic advantage.-The manufacturer
often has superior ability to spread costs of injury through society by
raising product prices.30 Furthermore, strict liability has been rationalized as a necessary cost of doing business, automatically assumed
when manufacturing activity begins.31
(3) deterrence of defective products.3 2 -The ease of making
out a strict liability claim, along with the potential of realizing huge
judgments, is thought to induce manufacturer scrutiny of product
33

safety.

(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Under a strict liability test the plaintiff's burden of proof is lessened since § 402A(2)(a) eliminates the need for plaintiff to prove fault.
25, 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
26. See, e.g., Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of
Strict Tort Liability For Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 809-810 (1976).
27. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
28. See Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir.
1979) (applying California law) (strict liability not applied where commercial plaintiff, capable of inspecting for defects, did not require strict liability protection).
29. See Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
30. Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir.
1979); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 252, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182

(1970).
31. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 26, at 809-10.
32. Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir.
1979); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring.)
33. Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir.
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(4) fairness.-Unfamiliaritywith manufacturing operations is
often thought to make a plaintiff's burden of proof improperly difficult in negligence cases.34
Although the concept of strict products liability is widely utilized,35 its limits are uncertain.3 6 A Commerce Department report
suggests that a few courts have stretched the doctrine to provide re-

covery for persons who prove injury from a product regardless of any
proof of actual defect.3 7 Haphazard and liberal use of strict liability
has spurred the Department of Commerce to draft the Uniform
Products Liability Act (UPLA) 38 to promote stability in governing
law, in product liability insurance rates, and in consumer
protection.39
In numerous ways the UPLA exemplifies a restrained approach
to products liability. 40 Rather than imposing strict liability in all
cases of product defect, the UPLA limits the doctrine to those cases
involving either a manufacturing defect or a breach of an express
warranty. 41 Because a manufacturing defect is, by definition, an ab42
erration of an intended product design, it occurs only infrequently.
The UPLA justifies applying strict liability to manufacturing defects
and warranty violations by asserting that insurance systems can absorb the cost of injuries from such claims. 43 Additional justification
1979).
34. Id.
35. See discussion supra note 23.
36. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681,
683 (1980).

37. U.S.

DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY,

(1977); cf. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d
443, 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239-40 (1978) (where plaintiff shows product design proximately caused injury, defendant must prove product not defective).
38. UPLA, supra note 8, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714.
39. Introduction to id., 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,714.
40. See, e.g., Caprara v. Chrysler Corp. 52 N.Y.2d 114, 136 n.7, 417 N.E. 545, 556 n.7,
436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 262 n.7 (1981) (Jasen, Jones, Meyer, JJ., dissenting) (UPLA restrictive of
strict liability in prohibiting use of subsequent repair or design change to prove product defecFINAL REPORT at 1-27

tive); Note, Various Risk Allocation Schemes Under the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act: An Analysis of the Statute of Repose, Comparative Fault Principles,and the Conflicting
Social Policies Arising From Workplace Product Injuries, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 588, 593
(1980).

41. UPLA, supra note 8, § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,721. For a view that this distinction
is improper, see Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 224-30.
42. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1543 (1973).
43. UPLA, supra note 8, § 104 analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722.
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is found in the violation of consumer expectation.4 4
UPLA imposes liability on a fault basis, however, for cases involving design defects-where the defect is part of the intended design- 45 or in cases of inadequate warning by a manufacturer. 46 A
fault standard must also be satisfied where suit is brought against a

nonmanufacturer seller.47 Applying such a fault standard is at variance with most case law4 8 and the Restatement4 9 which impose
strict liability in all product liability suits regardless of the type of
defect. The UPLA justifies this difference by considering negligence
a sufficient deterrent to the production of defectively designed prod-

ucts: Substantial economic risk occurs when each item manufactured
according to the design may subject a defendant to liability. A man-

ufacturing defect, in contrast, seldom occurs. To deter a lesser risk
of defect, then, strict liability must be imposed.5 0 Furthermore, in a

spirit of restraint, the UPLA explicitly rejects the notion that tort
law is a compensation system;5 1 liability is not to be imposed unless

injury is accompanied by fault.
Perhaps, even if the UPLA is not enacted by state legislatures,

its reasoning will persuade the courts to restrict their application of
strict products liability.52 In light of the *possible trend toward re44. Id. This justification satisfies UPLA policies of consumer protection and stable insurance rates. See supra text accompanying note 39.
45. Henderson, supra note 42, at 1543.
46. UPLA, supra note 8, § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Young v. Up-Right Scaffold, Inc., 637 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Sochanski v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 621 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Robinson v. Reed-Prentice, 49 N.Y.2d 471, 478, 403 N.E. 440, 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720
(1980). But cf. DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(whether strict liability or negligence applied to design defects, plaintiff must prove essentially
same elements).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965). For the text of this section, see
supra note 24.
50. UPLA, supra note 8, § 104 analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722. This rationale satisfies
UPLA policies of consumer protection and stable insurance rates. See supra text accompanying note 39. Although deterring defective products has been a cornerstone of strict liability, see
supra text accompanying notes 32-33, the UPLA fails to consider whether any of the other
popular justifications of strict liability, see supra text accompanying notes 27-31, 34, are statisfled by its application of a negligence standard to design defects an inadequate warnings.
51. Introduction to UPLA, supra note 8, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,715.
52. Several courts have cited the UPLA. E.g., Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654
F.2d 1337, 1345 n.10 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying Idaho Law) (citing UPLA for premise that
defectiveness is question of fact); Wentworth v. Kawasaki, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 114, 117
(D.N,H. 1981) (applying New Hampshire law) (citing UPLA for propostion that any person
or entity suffering harm from defective product has standing to sue); Caprara v. Chrysler
Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 124 n.5, 417 N.E. 545, 556 n.5, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256 n.5 (1981)
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straint in the use of strict liability in the products area generally, 53

courts should also consider limiting or eliminating strict liability in
successor liability cases.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY OF A SUCCESSOR CORPORATION

The doctrine of strict liability has only recently been used to
impose liability on a successor corporation for the defective products
of its predecessor. 54 Both historically and at present the prevalent
approach is to analyze successor liability in terms of continuation of
ownership interest between pedecessor and successor. 5 Since the
mere purchase of assets generally does not give rise to an ownership
interest in the predecessor,58 the general rule of law does not lead to
liability for a successor. 57 Judicially recognized exceptions to the
general rule call for liability when:
(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such
debts; (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of
the seller and purchaser; (3) the purchasing corporation is merely a
continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts.58
Although the first and fourth exceptions are clear on their face, the
terms and rationale of the second and third require explanation. A
(citing UPLA for definition of defective product); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260,
297, 305 n.28, 294 N.W.2d 437, 456, 460 n.28 (1980) (citing UPLA as support for awarding
punitive damages in product liability actions).
Federal Trade Commission Chairman James C. Miller III apparently advocates limited
liability: "'Imperfect products' should be available . . . because consumers have 'different
preferences for defect avoidance.' . . . Those who have a low aversion to risk-relative to
money-will be more likely to purchase cheap, unreliable products." N.Y. Times, Oct. 27,
1981, at Al, col. 5.
53. See infra notes 138, 147-49 and accompanying text.
54. Note, Ray v. Alad Corporation: Imposing Liability on the Successor Corporation
for the Defective Products of the Predecessor Corporation, 15 CAL. W.L. REV. 338, 339
(1979); see infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974);
Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying California law);
McGaffey & Hunt, Continuity of ShareholderInterest in Acquisitive CorporateReorganizations, 59 TAXES, 659 (1981).
56. Note, Assumption of Product Liability in CorporateAcquisitions, 55 B.U. L. REV.
86, 91 (1975).
57. E.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc.,
86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981); W. FLETCHER, supra note I §§ 7122, 7123.
58. Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Colo. 1968) (citations omitted); see also Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Ramirez v. Armstead Indus. Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
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merger exists where the predecessor and successor unite and only the

successor survives, whereas a consolidation of corporations causes an
entirely new corporation to emerge.59 A continuation is found where
the successor is comprised primarily or entirely of the constituent
elements of the predecessor. 0
The second and third exceptions yield successor liability because
more than a mere sale of assets has occurred: In the case of merger,
consolidation, or continuation, a semblance of ownership interest is
created. "[T]he corporate entity is left substantially intact,"61 and,
therefore, retains its own liabilities. 2 The two salient characteristics
of these exceptions are continuity of operation and ownership, and
prompt dissolution by the predecessor. s
ANALYSIS OF THE TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS: NARROW
6 4
CONSTRUCTION

In Kloberdanz v. Joy Manufacturing Co.,65 the defendant purchased the assets and liabilities of a company for adequate cash consideration.6 6 The sale allowed the defendant to continue the manufacturing operations of its predecessor. 7 As a consequence of the
sale, the predecessor ceased manufacturing but did not dissolve or
liquidate until ten months later. During this period the predecessor
invested the sale proceeds and engaged in a leasing business.68 Approximately six years after the sale of assets, the plaintiff was injured by a machine that had been manufactured ten years earlier by
59. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 346, at 713 (2d ed. 1970).
60. See Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968). For the
elements that constitute continuity of enterprise, see infra text accompanying note 74.
61. Note, supra note 56, at 92.
62. Id. Despite the facial change of corporate form resulting from a consolidation, the
new corporation still consists of the same ownership elements, and the original corporation is
thus considered substantially intact.
63. Note, Products Liability: Development in the Rule of Successor Liability For Product-Related Injuries, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 338, 353 (1979).
64. For a discussion of the broad interpretations of the traditional exceptions, see infra
text accompanying notes 97-120.
65. 288 F. Supp. 817 (D.Colo. 1968).
66. Id. at 820.
67. See McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 570, 264 A.2d 98, 106
(Law Div. 1970) (holding that "[w]hen one company purchases all the assets of another, it is
to be expected that the purchasing corporation will continue the operations of the former, but
this does not by itself render the purchaser liable for the obligations of the former"), afid per
curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972). But see Ramirez v. Amstead
Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 357, 431 A.2d 811, 824 (1981) (overruling McKee insofar as it
applies to tort actions).
68. 288 F. Supp. at 819.
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the predecessor.69
Plaintiff argued that the exceptions to the rule of nonliability of
a successor were applicable. The court, following the rationale of
other courts in similar cases,70 negated de facto merger and consolidation claims. The court determined that the predecessor and successor remained totally separate 1 before and after the sale,72 despite
defendant's continuation of the predecessor's manufacturing operations. The evidentiary support for the court's conclusion was the
predecessor's continued existence after the sale, lack of predecessor
interest in the successor, and the use of the predecessor's name only
as a trademark. 7 The continuation exception was not satisfied because there was no common ownership interest in stock, and the corporations had no common directors or stockholders.74The successor,
therefore, did not serve merely as a "new hat" for the seller.7
In Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.," the court found successor liability where stock in the successor was the consideration in an
asset sale. Upon the transferor's dissolution and liquidation, the consideration, which was not required for satisfaction of seller's debts,
was distributed to the transferor's shareholders. 77 The shareholders
thus became a constituent of the successor, a factor which, in conjunction with transferor's rapid dissolution, commonality in operation, management and employees, and assumption of all debts necessary for continued business operations, allowed the court to find
69. Id. at 820.
70. E.g., Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1973); McKee
v. Harris Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 565-67, 264 A.2d 98, 103-04 (Law Div. 1970),
affd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (App. Div. 1972).
71. 288 F. Supp. at 821.

72.
merger),
at 713.
73.
74.
75.

In other words, there was no continuation of the predecessor (as required for a
nor did a new corporation emerge after the sale. See H. HENN, supra note 59, § 346,
288 F. Supp. at 821.
Id.
See McKee v. Harris Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 570, 264 A.2d 98, 106

(Law Div. 1970).
76.

379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (applying New Jersey law).

77. Id. at 799, 801. Where stock received as consideration for an asset sale is distributed
to the shareholders of the transferor company, however, the transferee is liable for transferor

debts on the theory that consideration is inadequate and the sale is constructively fraudulent as
to the seller's creditors. This is because the purchaser must have knowledge that such a transaction prevents the seller's creditors' collection of their receivables. W. FLETCHER, supra note
8, § 7127, at 205. Shannon, therefore, demonstrates that even where a stock transfer cannot be
considered fraudulent-stock having been set aside for creditors-a stock transfer can re-

present commonality of interest between seller and purchaser. Stock in the purchaser can also
be considered a valuable asset. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
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liability under the de facto merger exception. 8
Shannon demonstrates the tenuousness of the distinction between the de facto merger and continuation exceptions. Although the
court characterized the transaction as a de facto merger,7 9 the same
facts would support a finding that the successor was only a "new
hat" for the transferor. Regardless of the label given the exception,
the dominant elements in each are continuity of operation and ownership, and prompt dissolution of the predecessor.80
Shannon also demonstrates judicial antagonism toward the general rule of nonliability as it affects tort cases. In dicta, the court
noted that "solvent corporations, going concerns, should not be permitted to discharge their liabilities to injured persons simply by shuffling paper and manipulating corporate entities;" 81 and that "the
seller and purchaser corporation will not both be able to profit by
cutting off liability for damages to battered and maimed people."'82
Such dissatisfaction with the general rule of nonliability for successors in tort actions is directly attributable to the rule's corporate
law foundation.8" Both the rule and its exceptions were designed to
pr6tect the interests of corporate creditors, other corporate entities,"
and shareholders,85 rather than the needs of tort claimants.
The rule of successor nonliability does not impede a nontort
claimant's recovery, because the predecessor is more likely to be
available for such a suit. A creditor's claim is by its very nature
discernible before a sale, allowing him to sue promptly upon notification of dissolution.86 If the predecessor does not dissolve, the plain78. 379 F. Supp. at 801.
79. Id.
80.

See Note, supra note 63, at 353.

81. 379 F. Supp. at 803.
82. Id. at 802.
83. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 416-18, 244 N.W.2d 873,
877-78 (1976).
84, W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 7122, at 189. The general rule and its exceptions,
however, will also apply to tort claims. Applicability of a rule, however, is distinguishable from
the application of the rule to the subject matter for which it was designed. Id. § 7123; see
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). The de facto
merger exception was developed to ensure that minority shareholders received appraisal rights
for their shares of stock as they would under a statutory merger. H. HENN, supra note 59, §
349, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262. (1974).
85. W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 7045.1, at 724.
86. A corporation must file a statement of intent to dissolve with the Secretary of State.
See, e.g,, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1002 (McKinney 1963). A corporation must mail notice of

dissolution to each known creditor, id. § 1007(a), and then proceed to satisfy corporate obligations and liabilities. Id. § 1005. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 278, 281 (1974) (corpora-
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tiff-creditor maintains the cause of action directly against the transferor. Thus a successor's shield against liability under the general
rule has little effect on the corporate creditor.
. A tort claimant, unlike a creditor, is greatly affected by the successor's shield because his or her cause of action does not accrue
81
until the time of injury, which is often long after a sale of assets.
There is a greater probability, therefore, that a corporation will already be insolvent or have dissolved by the time a tort suit can be
brought. The likelihood of recovery is thus correspondingly
diminished. 88
Two procedures-trust funds and abatement statutes-may
partially overcome obstacles to recovery against a successor. They
are of more utility, however, to creditors than to tort claimants, who
are paradoxically more in need of help. The trust fund theory provides that after consideration is received for an asset sale, known
creditors are satisfied first. Remaining funds are then distributed to
shareholders and constructively held in trust for the benefit of unpaid creditors.8 The trust fund theory is feeble because, with the
passage of time, which is the crucial distinction between tort and
nontort plaintiffs, it becomes more onerous to locate and recover
from individual shareholders 0 Recovery may also be achieved under
an applicable abatement statute, under which the time for abatement of claims is delayed for a specified period, during which funds
must be kept available to satisfy potential claims. 91 The "catch 22"
of this solution as it affects tort claimants is that only claims known
at the time of dissolution are protected.92 The current state of the
law is particularly distressing because the tort plaintiff should have a
superior right to judgment. Unlike a creditor, a tort claimant does
not bargain for nonpayment, nor does he or she profit from assumption must continue to exist for three years after dissolution to discharge its liabilities).
87. In Kloberdanz, for instance, see supra text accompanying notes 65-69, the plaintiff
was injured six years after the sale of assets by a product manufactured four years before the
sale.
88. Note, supra note 56, at 96-97; see Wallach, A Remedy of Search of a Defendant:
The Effect of a Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution of Product DissatisfactionClaims,
41 Mo. L. REV. 321 (1976).

89. Note, supra note 63, at 342. The details and utility of the trust fund theory are
beyond the scope of this note; for a full discussion of this area, see Wallach, supra note 88.
90. Note, supra note 63, at 343.
91. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-9(f) (West 1969) (providing two year abatement
period for claims that existed prior to dissolution).
92. Id; Note, supra note 63 at 343.
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tion of the risk of nonpayment.9 3
In light of the formidable task faced by tort plaintiffs seeking
recovery against a predecessor,94 the rule of successor nonliability
may be7 viewed as offensive as it pertains to tort claimants. Where
judges have been ill at ease in this situation, it appears that they
have either masked their dismay through manipulation of established
exceptions, 95 or have constructed new judicial exceptions to compensate for inadequacies in existing law. 96
ANALYSIS OF THE TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS: BROAD
CONSTRUCTION

In Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp.,97 the successor
purchased substantially all of a company's assets for a stock consideration and assumed its nontort liabilities. While the contract called
for the seller's dissolution as soon as possible after the distribution of
the stock to its shareholders, the predecessor continued to exist for
eighteen months.98 The court conceded that these facts did not technically comply with the de facto merger or continuation requirements since the predecessor maintained a separate existence for
eighteen months after the sale and possessed valuable assets-the
successor's stock9 9-- which could be used to satisfy tort and business
claimants. 10 0 Nevertheless, the court held the successor liable for
plaintiff's injuries under the de facto merger exception.101 Unwilling
to allow the predecessor's brief and insubstantial existence to prevent
plaintiff's recovery,1 0 2 and refusing to be limited by what it termed
93. Dyer, Successor Liability in CorporateAcquisitions-An Examination of Attempts
to Limit the Use of the De Facto Merger Doctrine, 46 J. AIR L. & CoM. 483, 494 (1981).
94. For dicussion of the difficulty in pursuing a predecessor corporation, see supra text
accompanying notes 87-92.
95. For discussion of broad application of traditional exceptions, see infra text accompanying notes 97-120.
96. For discussion of new judical answers to successor liability, see infra text accompanying notes 121-53.
97. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974) (applying Pennsylvania law), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
965 (1975).
98. Id. at 363-64, 369.
99. Id. at 367. Because the corporation received the stock (as opposed to direct transfer
of stock to the seller's shareholders, which would cause the corporation to become a mere
shell), the stock consideration could have been considered a valuable asset. See id. at 366;
supra note 77,
100. 506 F.2d at 367.
101. Id. at 370.
102. Id. at 368-69.
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"a mere procrustean application of formalities,' 10 3 the court imposed
liability based on a public policy of loss-spreading.
The opinion reflects the court's search for fault on the part of
the successor. Perhaps the court strained for additional justification
because of the liberty it assumed in applying the de facto merger
exception. While liability was found under principles of corporate
law, the rationale of the decision sounded in tort. Fault was found in
contract requirements of dissolution, restraint of competition, and inhibition of the predecessor's use of its remaining assets. 04 These requirements in effect prevented the seller from remaining financially
viable and satisfying claims. The court also considered the expeditious dissolution of the seller,105 as well as the failure to assign the
predecessor's products liability insurance policy.' 06
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,' 07 exemplifies another manipulation of
the traditional exceptions. The predecessor's employees, who purchased the assets and good will of the business, were required to
operate it in the same manner as the transferor. 0 8 The court recognized that there was a good-faith, arms-length sale, as well as a total
change in owernship,10° a situation not constituting a mere continuation. 1 Nevertheless, liability was imposed because the same employees, product, plant, supervision, and name were used," 1 making
the sale "one where facial and substantive continuity were the essence of the bargain.""' 2 The court held that this facade of continuity invoked the mere-continuation exception," 3 which had previously applied only to continuity of ownership interest rather than
continuity of business operations." 4 The court justified this departure from traditional corporate law by noting that the case involved
103.

Id. at 369.

104. Id. at 367. The seller was not allowed to sell the stock in the successor that it
received as consideration; furthermore, the seller was unable to invest this asset for profit. Id.
105. While the Knapp court characterizes an eighteen-month existence as brief, 506
F.2d at 367, the court in Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968),
deemed a ten-month existence sufficient.
106. 506 F.2d at 370.
107. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law).
108. Id.at 1151.
109. Id.at 1151-52.
110. For discussion of the mere-continuation exception, see supra text accompanying
notes 63, 74-75.
111. 501 F.2d at 1154.
112. Id. at 1152.
113. Id. at 1154.
114. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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tort liability rather than corporate debts. 115
Other factors specific to Cyr may have influenced the court's
extension of the rule. The injury was caused by a machine that the
predecessor had serviced and that the defendant continued to service. 1 ' The possibility that the successor was negligent in not detecting and warning against the machine's defect 117 may have inclined the court to overstate the law, even though defendant's duty to
warn was not an issue given to the jury."" Furthermore, as the corporation's employees were the same before and after the sale, the
original wrongdoers remained part of the successor: "If as a group
the same employees continue, without pause to produce the same
products in the same plant, with the same supervision, the ownership
of the entity which maintains essentially the same name cannot be
the sole controlling determinant of liability.""' 9 Thus, liability might
have attached for the employees' original wrong, rather than for the
corporate continuity presented as the basis of the holding.1 20
ADOPTION OF A NEW TEST OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY: CONTINUITY
OF ENTERPRISE

In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,' 21 the defendant made a
cash purchase of the predecessor's business as a going concern, including its assets, good will, and trade name. The precedessor subsequently dissolved and liquidated. 2 2 Rather than analyzing the issue
of liability in terms of the traditional exceptions, the court followed
the general trend in products liability 2 3 and held that successor liability for products manufactured by a predecessor is a matter of tort
rather than corporate law.124 To facilitate its use of tort law, the
court developed a new exception to the general rule of nonliability:
continuity of enterprises.12 5 The facts of the case were held to pre115.
116.
117.

501 F.2d at 1153..
Id.
For discussion of successor's duty to warn, see infra text accompanying notes 220-

33.
118. Id. at 1153 n.14.
119. Id. at 1153.
120. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 453 n.6, 244 N.W.2d 873,
894 n.6 (Coleman, J., dissenting). For analysis of the ambiguities of Cyr, see Note, supra note
80, at 367-68.
121. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
122. Id. at 413, 244 N.W.2d at 875-76.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 9-53.
124. 397 Mich. at 416, 244 N.W.2d at 877.
125. Id. at 424-30, 244 N.W.2d at 881-84.
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sent a prima facie case of continuity of enterprise in that:
1) The seller corporation, .

.

. apparently, [retained] key

personnel, assets, general business operations, and even the [predecessor's] name.
2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business operations, liquidated, and dissolved soon after distribution of consideration received from the buying corporation.
3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and
obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the continuation of
the normal business operations of the seller corporation.
4) The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world as
the effective continuation of the seller corporation.12
Although the continuity-of-enterprise test is supported in the opinion
by tort policy, its factual analysis was clothed in corporate rather
than tort terms. The result is a decision laced with irreconcilable
law.
The first branch of the Turner test delineates the elements of
continuity of enterprise. Yet, rather than analyzing the tort significance of maintaining the same personnel, assets, trade name, and
business operation, the court justifies these elements solely through
its criticism of corporate law. The court reasoned that the successor
receives the same assets whether cash or stock is the consideration
paid to the seller. Since a de facto merger can be found when stock
is transferred, the court determined that the cash form of the consideration should be irrelevant.127 Recognizing that stock consideration
is traditionally required because it represents the commonality of interest necessary to impose the de facto merger exception, the court
criticized this common interest as "more symbolic than real. ' 128 It
reasoned that stockholders at the time of manufacture are likely to
be different from those at the time of sale.129 The first element is,
therefore, both contrary to corporate law principles and unsupported
by the court in tort terms.
The second branch-transferor liquidation-was stated as a
bare factual conclusion. Here however, the court might successfully
126. Id. at 424, 244 N.W.2d at 884.
127. Id. at 422, 244 N.W.2d at 880. Contra W. FLETCHER,supra note 1, § 7127 (form
of the consideration of utmost concern).
128. 397 Mich. at 422, 244 N.W.2d at 880.
129. Exception to this generalization would be made in the case of a close corporation.
See H. HENN,supra note 59, § 260, at 515 (shareholders of close corporation generally contract to exclude others from becoming shareholders). In a close corporation, therefore, shareholders are likely to be the same at the time of manufacture and the time of sale of assets.
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have utilized a most potent tort principle---causation- 130 as a component of its test. Although a mere sale of assets does not necessarily
cause a predecessor's dissolution and liquidation,' 1 when a contract
requires dissolution the defendant-successor is both the cause in fact
cause of the plaintiff's lack of remedy against the
and the proximate
13 2
predecessor.
The assumption of liabilities necessary to continuance of a business, the third branch of the continuity of enterprise test, is a notion
well grounded in corporate law tests of successor liability. 33a The
court did not attempt to integrate this principle with tort doctrine.
The fourth branch-defendant successor holding itself out as a
continuation of the precedessor-is premised on the theory that
"[o]ne who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by
another is subject to . . . liability as though he were its manufac-

turer. ' 134 Although consistent with tort doctrine, the court failed to
analyze the substantive reality behind the concept. The traditional
basis of liability is the falsity of the representation inducing the sale
of a defective product.'3 5 Thus, although the application of tort law
to successor liability is conceptually justifiable, the Turner court
failed to devise a meritorious tort test.' 3 6
ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE LIABILITY ON A SUCCESSOR
CORPORATION: THE PRODUCT-LINE THEORY

In reaction to the inadequacy of the general rule of successor
liability and its exceptions, the California Supreme Court in Ray v.
Alad Corp.137 instituted a tort concept of successor liability-the
product-line theory.'38 The facts of Alad are similar to those of other
130.

See W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 41, at 236. For discussion of control as an ele-

ment of successor liability in the proposed test, see infra text accompanying notes 203-07.
131. W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 7083, at 107; see also Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co.,
645 F,2d 620, 621 (8th Cir. 1981) (sale of assets did not cause seller's dissolution where

predecessor engaged in another business after sale).
132. Even if the sale results in the seller's dissolution, the successor may not have been
the proximate cause even if it were the cause in fact. See W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 41, at
236.
133. E.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
134. 397 Mich. at 426, 144 N.W.2d at 882 (emphasis added) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965)).

135.

See

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A (liability imposed on product

seller). For 'the text of this section, see supra note 24.
136. For a detailed analysis of Turner's strengths and weaknesses, see Note, supra note
63, at 370-87.
137. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
138. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582. Other courts have subsequently
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successor liability cases: The defendant purchased the plant, equipment, inventory, trade name, and good will of the predecessor for
adequate cash consideration." 9 The contract called for prompt dissolution of the predecessor and a restrictive covenant 1 40 and the predecessor complied by dissolving within two months of the sale."" Approximately six months later the plaintiff was injured by a ladder
manufactured and sold by the predecessor.14 After acquiring the
predecessor's assets, the defendant continued manufacturing the
same product line without significant disruption,1 43 employing some
of the predecessor's workers and soliciting many of its customers. 4
The successor also held itself out to be the predecessor.14 5 Yet, even
though the successor substantially continued the activities of the

predecessor, the court determined that none of the traditional exceptions for successor liability were satisfied.1 46
Despite the inapplicability of the corporate law exceptions, liability was imposed. The court held that where a party "acquires a
manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of prod-

ucts under the circumstances here presented [it] assumes strict tort
liability for defects in units of the same product line previously man-

ufactured and distributed by the entity from which the business was
acquired.

' 147

The court found that the public policy behind strict

examined the product-line exception, and some have adopted it. See, e.g., Rawlings v. D.M.
Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979); Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp.,
86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981); Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d
811 (1981). Other courts have rejected the product line theory, Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co.,
645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Missouri law); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443
(7th Cir. 1977)(applying Ohio and Indiana law); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437
(7th Cir. 1977)(applying Wisconsin law); Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817
(E.D. Tenn. 1978)(applying Pennsyvania law); Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., Inc., 394 So. 2d 552
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
139. 19 Cal. 3d at 24, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576. As in Knapp v. North Am.
Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d, 361, 370 (3d Cir. 1974)(applying Pennsylvania law), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975), the successor in Alad did not purchase the predecessor's unexpired insurance policy. The opinion does not indicate whether the insurance, if assigned, would have indemnified the successor.
140. 19 Cal. 3d at 27, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 25-26, 560 P.2d at 5-6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77.
143. Id. at 27, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 28, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578. There was adequate consideration,
no fraud, and no continuity of ownership interest.
147. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
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liability'48 mandated freedom from successor liability restraints. 149
To justify its finding the defendant liable, the Alad court employed a
three-tier test:
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the
original manufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the
business, (2) the successor's ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading [role], and (3) the fairness of requiring
the successor to assume a responsibility for defective products that
was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's
good will being enjoyed
by the successor in the continued operation
50
of the business.

The court determined that these concerns must necessarily take precedence over the free availability and transferability of capital,
which is the fundamental advantage of the nonliability rule.''
Several weaknesses inhere in the product-line rule as expounded
in Alad and adopted by other courts: 52 (1) its unjustified application
of strict tort liability to successor corporations; (2) its ambiguity in
defining exactly what constitutes the same product line; (3) its imperfect justification for imposing liability.
Strict liability and successor corporations.-The apparent
weakness of the product-line exception sounding in strict liability is
that the successor has not put the defective article into commerce as
strict product liability mandates. 1 3 In addition, even if the successor
causes the destruction of plaintiff's remedy,154 such a situation may
148. For a discussion of this policy, see Montgomery & Owen, supra note 26.
149. 19 Cal. 3d at 30-31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80. The court reasoned
that the public policy behind labor law allowed certain shackles of successor liability law to be
unhinged: Where a successor acquires a going concern, it becomes mandatory for the successor
to succeed to the predecessor's federal obligations to employees and their bargaining repesentatives. Similarly, policies of strict tort liability call for the spillover of this freedom in the area
of products liability of the successor for defects in the predecessor's products. Id.
150. Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
151. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
152. See, e.g., Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119
(1979); Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981); Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
153. Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 624-25 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Missouri law); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
154. The successor might be the cause in fact of destruction of plaintiff's remedy in that
but for the sale of assets the predecessor would still be viable. Such a finding is insufficient,
however, because proximate cause is required. W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 41, at 236. For a
discussion of the possible significance of a successor's destruction of plaintiff's remedy against
the predecessor, see infra text accompanying notes 203-07.
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not be the proximate cause 155 of plaintiff's injury. 156
The corporate stranger which purchases some or all of the assets of
a corporation bears no closer relationship to a defective product
produced by that predecessor than does any other company in the
industry which is producing the same product. Indeed, most of the
policies advanced by the courts in support of the rule of expanded
liability would be more efficiently advanced by placing liability on
the entire industry rather than on the good157faith purchaser alone.
No court has ever suggested such a result.
Rather than addressing the lack of normal tort causation inherent in strict liability doctrine, the court supports its test with strict
liability policy-particularly the cost-spreading ability of a successor
corporation that continues the same product as the predecessor. 15 8 In
light of a possible conservative trend in the application and definition
of strict products liability, 159 the mere existence of similiar policy
concerns does not warrant the imposition of strict tort liability on a
successor. As tort law is not merely a compensation system, successor liability should not be dictated by a successor's deep pocket.
What constitutes the product line?-The second area of difficulty in Alad is determining how literally the court intended its
same-product-line standard. It refers to testimony labeling the defective product "as 'an old' model manufactured by [the precedessor]. ' 160 At least one court has interpreted Alad as mandating continuation of the same model.16 1 The Alad court notes that the
predecessor and successor used "identical 'extrusion plans'

..

for

producing the aluminum components of the ladders. 16 2 Assuming
that the product defect was the aluminum component, the same
155. Proximate cause and cause in fact are among the cornerstones of tort law. W.
supra note 23, § 41, at 236.
156. But cf. Note, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations,27
HASTINGS L.J. 1305, 1327 (1976) (respondeat superior rationale supports successor liability
because of successor's ability to maximize profit and spread cost). This analogy seems inexact,
however, since respondeat superior includes the concepts of master's ability to control the servant's acts and the master's role in causing the servant's acts, neither of which is present in the
successor liability context. For a discussion of respondent superior, see W. PROSSER, supra note
23, § 69, at 459.
157. Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, 463 F. Supp. 817, 820 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
158. 19 Cal. 3d at 30-31, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 34-44.
160. 19 Cal. 3d at 26, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. 576.
161. See Gee v. Tenneco, 615 F.2d 857, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying California
law).
162. 19 Cal. 3d at 27, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
PROSSER,
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product line could mean the same product defect.
Despite the Alad court's admonition that its product-line rule
applied only in the "narrow circumstances presented," 16 3 Rawlings
v. D.M. Oliver, Inc.16 4 held that a successor was liable under the rule
regardless of successor's alleged elimination of the particular line of
products that injured the plaintiff.'6 5 Perhaps the Alad court intended the same product line to mean only the continuation of a basic type of goods. The ambiguity of Alad extends beyond the mere
enumeration of the type of factual situations that triggered application of the product-line rule. The meaning and scope of the phrase
necessarily affect the soundness of both the rule itself and its
justification.
Justificationsfor product line liability.-Assuming the court
imposed liability because the defendant continued to produce the
same product as the predecessor, the court's reasoning that the successor could spread risk"66 is convincing. In such a situation, the successor would possess the same information as did the predecessor,
enabling assessment of product safety and, ultimately, spreading of
risk.1 67 This, the court determined, fosters a successor's ability to obtain adequate insurance or effectively pass costs on to consumers. 6 8
If in contrast, the defect was the result of a discontinued design, the
ability to gauge risks would diminish. Mere production of ladders
can hardly impart knowledge to a successor of risks associated with
an obsolete model. Furthermore, it seems unjust to impose liability
163. Id. at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
164. 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979).
165. "[M]anufacturing activity by its very nature involves modification of a product line
or elimination of an unprofitable item. . . .The general business continued by the manufacturer and its ability to spread these costs must be considered and not merely whether a specific
line of products was discontinued." Id. at 901, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
166. Risk-spreading is the second tier of the Alad court's justification. 19 Cal. 3d at 31,
560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
167. The opinion mentions that the successor's knowledge of past operations enables it
to estimate potential claims on past products. Id. at 33, 560 P. 2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
See Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 352, 431 A.2d 811, 821-22 (1981). But see
Rawlings, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 901, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
168. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581. This rationale ignores the frequent difficulty in obtaining product liability insurance and/or remaining a solvent
business while passing on costs that consumers may be unwilling to bear. The UPLA was
proposed because of the difficulty businesses have in obtaining and affording products liability
insurance. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINEss, ANNUAL REPORT, S. REP. No.
629, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 167-71 (1978). Cf.Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332,
353, 431 A.2d 811, 822 (noting that imposition of liability may effect owner's ability to sell a
business).
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on a successor who chose9 not to continue a specific product line that
16
proved to be defective.

Liability may have been imposed in Alad, however, based on
the pure economics of risk-spreading.1 70 By acquiring the resources
and the same type of consumers as the predecessor, costs of injury
could be distributed among future buyers. 7 1 A successor's ability to
perceive risks (by producing the same product) and allocate present
cost is thus immaterial, a view that is apparent in the recent product-line decision of Ramirez v. Amstead Industries, Inc.172 Although
briefly considering the successor's ability to perceive and avoid risks,
the court more pointedly addressed the successor's ability to spread
costs.1 73 Even if risk assessment is Alad's rationale, Ramirez demonstrates that deep-pocket notions have persisted.174

In Alad, the destruction of the plaintiffs remedy against the
original manufacturer was considered on essential justification for liability."1 5 This rationale is weak considering that' the plaintiff would
be remediless if the predecessor had happened to dissolve and scatter
its assets rather than selling them to a successor. 76 Perhaps this
problem inspired one court to state, in rejecting the product-line
rule, that a case must be decided on "reasoned legal principles rather
' 77
than upon the fortuitous circumstance of a solvent defendant.'
169. See Note, supra note 156, at 1330.
170. The opinion discusses the successor's possession of resources available to remunerate injured product users. 19 Cal. 3d at 33, 560 P.2d at 10, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
171. Simple cost-spreading is a major prong of strict tort liability. See Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Montgomery
& Owen, supra note 26, at 810.
172. 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981). In Ramirez the successor purchased for cash
substantially all the predecessor's assets and continued, without significant interruption, the
same manufacturing operations. The court found that the successor could be liable under a
Turner mere-continuation analysis; nevertheless, it determined that it was more appropriate to
look to the successor's continuation of the actual manufacturing operation-the product-line
exception-rather than to continuity of the corporate entity. Id. at 347, 431 A.2d at 818-19.
173. Id. at 351, 431 A.2d at 821-22.
174. See also Rawlings, 97 Cal. App. 3d at 901, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25 (defective
product discontinued). The imposition of cost-spreading responsibility has been uniformly justified by the third tier of Alad's rationale-a successor deriving benefits through holding itself
out as the predecessor necessitates its assuming the corresponding burdens. E.g., Gee v. Tenneco, 615 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1980); Rawlings, 97 Cal. App. at 901, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 124
(1979); Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822.
175. 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
176. Woody v. Combustion Eng'g., 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1978). There is
concern that if liability is imposed more fequently on a successor, asset sales will decrease. The
net effect, therefore, would still be a remediless plaintiff. See infra text accompanying note
202.
177. Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 394 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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The Alad test, when scrutinized, calls for more than the fortutious chance of availability of the successor and unavailability of the
predecessor. According to Alad, the destruction of the plaintiff's
remedy must be caused by the successor's acquisition of the predecessor's business.178 Because the sale of assets is not equivalent to a
dissolution of the seller, 1 79 it should not automatically satisfy Alad's

requirements of destruction of plaintiff's remedy.1 80 In Alad, the successor did cause the predecessor's unavailability because the contract
called for both the dissolution of the predecessor and a restrictive
covenant.1 8 Destruction of a party's remedy is not, however, a tor82
tious act in itself.1

It is unclear how the narrow facts of Alad will influence other
courts in construing the causation requirement of unavailability. In
Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver Inc.,18h the court refused to limit the product line to an "Alad clone.'1

4

Rawlings departs from Alad in hold-

ing the successor liable despite the possibility of recovery from another solvent successor.
Cases applying the product-line rule, or the traditional exceptions, sometimes rely in part on the successor's acquisition of the
seller's good will' 8 as a basis of imposing liability.186 The premise
here is that when a buyer acquires a reputable going concern he benefits from its good will; correspondingly, he must assume the burdens
178. 19 Cal, 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
179. For the various implications of an asset sale, see infra note 204.
180. Furthermore, even if the predecessor does dissolve as a result of the sale, the plaintiff may still theoretically have a remedy against a predecessor. In reality, however, this is
often not practical. See supra text accompanying notes 84-87.
181. 19 Cal. 3d at 26, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577. Cases applying the traditional rule or the product-line exception have noted provisions for dissolution and/or a restrictive covenant. E.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363, (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo.
1968) (applying California law); see also Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 Il1. App. 3d
664, 669, 388 N.E.2d 778, 781 (1979) (lack of restrictive covenant considered in not imposing
product-line exception).
182. For a suggestion of circumstances that could give rise to a successor's duty to compensate a plaintiff, see infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
183. 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979).
184. Id. at 900, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 124; see also Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J.
361, 371, 431 A.2d 826, 831 (1981) (liability can be imposed on intermediate successor corporation even where successor is viable and continues to produce same product line as defective
product).
185. Good will includes the predecessor's reputation and the successor's public representation of the predecessor's continued existence. See Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822.
186. Id.; Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D. Mich. 1974)
(applying New Jersey law).
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of potential liability as did the predecessor.287 This focus is shortsighted, since the acquisition of benefits does not and should not necessitate assumption of all burdens. The successor is not legally
bound to assume the predecessor's role.188 Furthermore, the use of a
trade name and good will will not always benefit the successor, who
in fact takes such a risk in bargaining. The successor's reputation
may be damaged by product failure, when it buys a product line
within which the predecessor produced manufacturing defects, 8 9 or
when it does not purchase a product line that is later found defective. Thus, the successor may not always benefit from the purchase
of good will as courts have assumed.190 Additionally, the predecessor's continued liability is presumably reflected in a higher purchase
price. If a successor were to assume liabilities, the consideration the
predecessor received would correspondingly decrease. A successor
good faith purchaser for value held liable for unbargained for tort
claims is confronted with an uncalculated and unexpected expense.191 The benefits the successor receives thus may not be as great
as they initially appear. The argument that reaping benefits necessitates assuming burdens is not viable when unsupported by legal doctrine or specific facts in a case.
Although the product-line rule is troublesome, the principle of
imposing tort liability is meritorious. There are situations where a
successor legitimately can and should be found liable based on tort
law; strict liability, however, should not be utilized. A rule can be
developed that facilitates both tort and corporate law interests.
PROPOSED EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE OF NONLIABILITY
OF A SUCCESSOR

(1) Where the sale of assets of a predecessor's corporation
causes the predecessor's dissolution, whether it be (a) a requirement
187. Alad, 19 Cal. 3d at 34-35, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
188. "An assets transaction is attractive because it may be made relatively free from
A merger, consolidation, or stock purchase subjects the buyer to ununknown liabilities ....
THE LAWYER'S BAsIc CORPORATE PRACTICE MANUAL § 912 (ALI
known liabilities.
1970).
189. UPLA, supra note 8, § 104 analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722.
190. Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
191. Cf. Ramirez, 86 N.J. at 359-60, 431 A.2d at 825-26 (Schreiber, J., concurring)
(strict liability should not be applied retrospectively because of adverse economic consequences
on successor). A predecessor, who originally bore this liability, receives windfall profits when
liability is avoided.
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of the contract, or (b) the foreseeable result of the contract; 192 and
where the defective product has been (a) designed defectively by the
predecessor"9 3 and (b) continued by the successor in subsantially the
same form, 194 the successor is liable for the injury proximately
caused by the product manufactured by the predecessor.
(2) Where the successor (a) ceases to produce a product, and
(b) does so because of actual knowledge of its defective design, the
successor is liable for injury proximately caused by the product if,
under the circumstances, a reasonable effort is not made to warn all
foreseeable product users.195
This proposal would be most effective if instituted through legislation""6 because the element of prospectiveness 197 would then be satisfied. In this regard, some uncertainty in successor liability law
would be eliminated, and the current problem of inefficient business
planning obviated." 8 In addition, prospectiveness would enhance the
tort claimant's chance of recovery because a successor that would be
liable under the proposed rule would have the same duty as did the
manufacturer of the product to procure insurance 99 and to keep
192. The successor should know that the sale will result in dissolution: (1) if it is stated
by the predecessor; (2) if consideration given must be used to satisfy creditors of an ailing
corporation; (3) if a restrictive covenant stifles the predecessor so as to make any future business venture unlikely; or (4) if the temporary continued existence is as a mere shell with only
negligible assets.
193. A design defect "conforms to the intended design" and is distinguishable from a
manufacturing defect. The latter "does not conform in some significant aspect to the intended
design, nor does it conform to the great majority of products manufactured in accordance with
that design." Henderson, supra note 36, at 1543. A factual analysis of what constitutes a
design defect and a manufacturing defect is beyond the scope of this note. For a review of this
area, see id.; Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REv.
551 (1980).
194. The defect must remain notwithstanding any product changes for this provision to
apply.
195. This provision may be optional because liability for breach of a duty to warn has,
to date, been given only cursory attention. See infra notes 221-33 and accompanying text.
196. The legislative medium has often been suggested. E.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc.,
565 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Wisconsin law); Note, supra note 56, at 110;
Introduction to UPLA, supra note 8, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,714.
197. Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 358, 431 A.2d 811, 825 (1981)
(Schreiber, J.,concurring).
198. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 428, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883
(1976). Knowledge of prospective liability facilitates business planning in that the worth of a
business is, at least in part, contingent on its potential liabilities. Accordingly, the probability
of a windfall to either predecesor or successor is lessened. See supra text accompanying note
191.
199. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 428, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883.
The difficulty in obtaining insurance, however, must be considered. See supra note 168.
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funds available to satisfy adverse judgments. 20 0 The proposed test
thus considers the interests of both parties involved in successor
suits-the injured individual and the corporation.
A greater number of asset sales, however, might produce liability under the proposed test than under the traditional exceptions. 20 '
Thus, one disadvantage of the proposed test might be that corporations anticipating a lower purchase price where liability could be imposed on a successor may choose piecemeal divestiture as opposed to
a sale of assets to one buyer.20 2
As will be discussed, the rule advocates a fault standard for imposing liability. The successor is primarily liable for injury caused by
a product manufactured by its predecessor because the successor has
caused the predecessor's dissolution. Although merely causing dissolution does not satisfy tort notions of causation, dissolution gives rise
to a successor's duty to assume potential tort liabilities under the
proposed test. Fault is found in the successor's continued production
of a defective product. If, on the other hand, the successor has discontinued the manufacture of a defective product, fault will be found
only in cases of inadequate warning.
Although an asset sale may result in a predecessor's dissolution,203 liability attaches under this test only if the contract provisions cause the predecessor's dissolution. 2° ' This approach differs significantly from one that imposes liability based merely upon
200. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 428, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883. A
successor that was aware of potential liability at the time of a contract for the sale of assets is
likely to have paid less consideration than if the sale were governed by the traditional rule of
nonliability. Therefore, the successor is more likely to have greater resources available with
which to satisfy a judgment.
201.

In successor liability cases, courts have not distinguished between manufacturing

defects and design defects for purposes of imposing liability. Hypothetical application of the
proposed test to already decided cases, therefore, is not possible.
202. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 428, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883
(1976).
203. E.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr.

577.
204. A sale of assets does not automatically cause dissolution. See W. FLETCHER, supra
note 1, § 7083, at 107. For instance, a predecessor may have utilized the consideration re-

ceived for other business activities. There is no dissolution in this situation, nor is the predecessor existing as a mere shell. In time, however, the predecessor may independently decide to

dissolve irrespective of any relationship with the successor, thus negating the finding of liability
under the proposed rule. If subsequent dissolution were fraudulent (with the knowledge of or

foreseeable by the successor), then justification for liability is in harmony with the proposed
exception.
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plaintiff's need for an economically viable defendant. 05 Dissolution
must be either a provision of the contract of sale or its foreseeable
result. 206 A successor is thus on notice that a plaintiff cannot realistically seek satisfaction from the original manufacturer, and can no
longer assert that the prededessor was to retain tort liability. Such
an argument would indicate lack of good faith in a purchase. Foreseeable dissolution under the proposed test, therefore, gives rise to a
successor duty to assume tort liabilities when bargaining to purchase
assets.20 7 Although negotiating for tort liabilities would increase the
complexity of an asset sale, it would lead to a more accurate valuation of assets and allow a plaintiff to recover.208
Liability would not be imposed on a successor unless a plaintiff's
injury could be traced to a product defectively designed by the predecessor and manufactured in the same defective form by the successor, the fault of which lies in its continued production of a defective
product. 20 9 Although successor liability cases have mentioned design
defects, such defects have not been directly related to the imposition
of liability. 21 0 Because a successor is in a position to assess risks2 "
and defects inherent in a defectively designed product, it has the
same duty as any other manufacturer to evaluate its product
safety.212 This would have the beneficial effect of stimulating product
improvement by the successor. 21" The ability to assess risk under the
proposed rule is therefore distinguishable from Ramirez' use of the
concept because here, product improvement rather than cost spread205.

Cf. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977) (no

indication of why dissolution due to sale is essential other than unavailability of remedy for
plaintiff).
206.

See Juenger & Schulman, Asset Sales and ProductsLiability, 22

WAYNE

L. REV.

39, 53-55 (1975) (discussing effect of dissolution); supra note 192 and accompanying text.
207. Cf. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 428, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883
(1976) (suggesting that parties bargain for liabilities).
208.
209.

Id.
See Note, supra note 169, at 1332 (fault to be inferred from continued production

of a defective product). In imposing liability on a successor, however, it is necessary to distinguish between manufacturing and design defects. See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (Ist Cir. 1974); Ramirez
v. Amstead Indus., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
211. See Ramirez v. Amstead Indus. Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 352, 431 A.2d 811, 821-22
(1981).
212. See UPLA, supra note 8, § 104 analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,723; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
213. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 425, 244 N.W.2d 873, 881
(1976) (citations omitted) (successor only entity capable of making product improvements).
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ing is the desired goal.214

It is important to differentiate between the manufacture and the
design of a defective product as they particularly affect successor
liability under the proposed test. Where a manufacturing defect
causes injury to a plaintiff, the injury is the result of the predecessor's manufacturing activity. The successor purchased a nondefective
product design, and has no special ability to assess defects in prior
manufacturing activity based on its own production of a nondefective
product.215 No liability inheres under the proposed test, therefore,
when a manufacturing defect causes injury.
A final justification for liability is the successor's continued
placement of a defectively designed product on the market. By this
activity a successor impliedly represents that a product remains reasonably safe and is of good quality. Such behavior induces consumer
reliance.216 Courts generally take one of two views concerning the
effect of market presence on liability. One relies on the successor's
holding itself out to be the predecessor: The successor is estopped
from denying this representation and becomes liable21 7 The other
interpretation is that continued market presence of a going concern
yields the benefit of good will and correspondingly should include the
disadvantage of its burdens.21 "
Where a successor continues to manufacture a defectively
designed product, it is liable under the proposed test. The situation
might arise, however, that once a defect becomes known to a successor, it discontinues manufacture of the product. Because this precludes the inference of a representation of product safety and consumer reliance, a legislature or court might find it desirable to end
the successor's responsibility for the product. Yet, a duty to warn
would still not be exceedingly burdensome.219
214.

Ramirez v. Amstead Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 352, 431 A.2d 811, 822 (1981).

Although cost-speading is advantageous, it should be an incidential benefit rather than the
basis for imposing liability.
215. See UPLA, supra note 8, § 104 analysis, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,722-23; supra note
169.
216. See Montgomery & Owen, supra note 26, at 809 (consumer-reliance rationale of
utmost importance for imposing strict libility on successor).
217.

See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New

Hampshire law) (successor's holding itself out to be predecessor necessaily fetters successor's
usual freedom from liability).

218. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D. Mich. 1974). For
discussion of benefits necessitating burdens, see supra text accompanying notes 185-90.

219. See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1977); Leannais v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441-43 (7th Cir. 1977); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp.
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A successor's duty to warn was considered in Shane v. Hoban
Inc.,220 where the successor purchased the assets of a corporation,
held itself out to be the predecessor, and continued to market the
same product line. 21 Partial summary judgment on the issue of liability was granted to the defendant, as the general rule of nonliability to a successor was determined to be controlling.22 Defendant's
motion was denied, however, insofar as it pertained to the question
of defendant's negligence in failing to warn of a defective product.
There were triable issues of fact, the court held, concerning successor's service contract on the defective machine and the successor's
acquired or actual knowledge of defect. 223 The defendant could be
considered a Good Samaritan, who would have no duty to warn. 224
The court noted that close scrutiny of the facts was necessary because plaintiff's claim for a duty to warn was "treading on uncharted
'225
precedential seas.
Cases indicate that nexus between the injured party and the
successor is of the utmost concern. 226 Analysis focuses on a service
relation between the parties, 227 knowledge of a defect, 228 and knowledge of the location of a product. 29 Generally, where there is no
service relationship, skepticism regarding the feasibility of discharging a duty to warn prevents the imposition of liability.230 This hesitancy is warranted if one mistakenly assumes that the duty to warn
always requires a direct warning. Surely where no service contract
526, 529-31 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 372-73, 431 A.2d
826, 832 (1981); see also Bell, The Manufacturer's Duty to Notify of Subsequent Safety
Improvements, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1981) (proposed duty on manufacturer to warn
of product's safety developments justified on basis of manufacturer's access to information
concerning product dangers). Accordingly, a successor's duty to warn is justifiable because the
successor acquires the requisite information base when it produces similar products.
220. 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
221. Id. at 529-30.
222. Id. at 530.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 444, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1977); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 442 7th Cir. 1977); Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526, 530
(E.D. Pa. 1971); Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 373, 431 A.2d 826, 833

(1981).

227.
228.
of defects,
229.

See Note, supra note 56, at 108; Note, supra note 54, at 362-63.
See Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 449 (7th Cir. 1977): "Absent knowledge
nothing is known to warn against."
"Absent knowledge of the location of a machine, there is no known entity to warn."

Id.
230. See supra note 200.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol10/iss3/7

28

Schuhalter: Successor Liability for Defective Products: A Tort Exception to a
1982]

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY

exists it would be burdensome to seek out all potential owners of a
defective product. This alone should not, however, stop the court
from imposing a duty to warn in all cases.
The product seller's duty to warn should be governed by what is
reasonable under the circumstances.2 31 Accordingly, a successor's
discharge of duty can be effective if it satisfies reasonableness standards 32 Where a service contract has been assumed by the successor, it is reasonable to contact the owner of a product. Where this is
not the case, perhaps advertising in a trade journal likely to reach
product users is all that should be necessary. Labels put on a successor's product after the defect has been corrected could put product
users on notice.2 33 The most liberal procedure would be the addition
to the successor's product line of obvious safety devides, which could
serve as an implicit warning. The vast degree of flexibility possible in
discharging the duty to warn justifies imposing the duty on a
successor.
CONCLUSION

Successor liability law is in a tenuous state. The general rule
does not call for liability unless specific conditions are satisfied. Even
if a business transaction is planned according to this rule, an exception may be uniquely construed by the court to result in the successor's liability. This unfairly burdens successors who have not bargained or planned for such liability. Where the plaintiff would
ordinarily be remediless under the general rule, he or she is often
made whole by stretching the rule's exceptions. Continued insensitivity to tort claimants is due to the rule's corporate law foundation.
Yet the application of tort law is more suitable for determining
liability of a successor for product liability. Corporate concerns could
be satisfied if a tort exception is known to apply in advance of business dealings. Fairness in a new tort exception can be achieved by
requiring a succesor's causative role in the predecessor's dissolution.
Fault can be found in the successor's continued production of a defectively designed product. At the very least, a duty to warn should
231. W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 96, at 646-47.
232. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)-(e) (service of process varies according to practicality,
e.g., depending on circumstances, defendant may be served personally or by general notice in
newspaper). Persons who must be warned of product defects are analogous to those who are
unknown beneficiaries of a large trust fund: both are difficult to ascertain and reach.
233. See W. PROSSER, supra note 23, § 96, at 646-47.
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be imposed on a successor that knows a product is defective, even if
the successor does not continue to produce the product.
Roberta L. Schuhalter
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